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ABSTRACT
Japan has a relatively unique system of labor compensation. Most Japanese
workers are paid large bonuses twice a year. This paper examines thecyclical
movement of bonuses compared with wages and the relation of bonuses to
employment in the context of the Weitzman "share economy."
The paper makes three basic points:
(1) The Japanese bonus is much more pro-cyclical than Japanese basewages,
but not as cyclically variable as profits. Bonuses can be interpreted as con-
taining a quantitatively significant revenue or profit—sharing component.
(2) Bonuses have quite different employment consequences than do base
wages. Even after controlling for other economic factors, bonuses are positi-
vely related to employment, whereas base wages are negatively related to
employment.
(3) The bonus system of paying workers, while far from explaining the
whole macroeconomic story in Japan, seems to play a role in helping to stabilize
Japanese unemployment at comparatively low levels.
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The bonus payment system, by which Japanese workers receive upwards of one
quarter of their yearly pay in the form of semi-annual bonuses, is one of the
exotic features of Japanese labor markets that have long fascinated outsiders.
Recently interest has been heightened by the realization that the bonus system
may have important macroeconomic implications along the lines of a "share
economy."1 It is at least conceivable that some part of Japan's remarkable abi-
lity to stabilize unemployment at low, steady rates is due to the automatic pay
flexibility that comes.with profit or revenue sharing. For a subject of such
potential importance, the Japanese bonus system has been relatively little
studied.
This paper reports the results of a detailed empirical analysis of Japanese
labor market data designed to address certain fundamental questions about the
bonus system. In it we analyse data on bonuses and other labor market variables
at the one and two digit industry level from 1958 to 1983, as well as data from
a case study of an individual firm. Our interpretations have been guided by the
results of interviews with Japanese employer federation representatives and
labor union officials.
I. Background
The purpose of this section is to place the subject of the Japanese bonus
system in a broader context. This is important because the bonus system is only
one part of the complicated, interrelated web of institutions and attitudes
that constitutes Japanese labor relations. Although we have tried hard to guard
against a mono-causal interpretation of the Japanese labor market, it is quite
possible that in analyzing the bonus system we inadvertently overlook other
important aspects of the industrial relations system which have also influenced
the behavior under study.2
The following stylized facts might be taken as roughly descriptive of how
the "Japanese model" of the labor market differs somewhat from others..2
(1) Firms h-ire workers directly out of school for "lifetime employment"
(the shushin koyo system). In fact this -isdoneprimarily by the large firms,
and only for their so-called "permanent" or "regular" employees(who constitute,
typically, half of all workers and three-fourths of those in manufacturing).
Nevertheless, the "lifetime commitment mentality" seems to be a fair charac-
terization of the Japanese system as a whole.3
(2) There is a steep age-earnings profile for permanent workers up to
retirement age of 55 or, more recently, 60. Pay is influenced greatly by
seniority. (This nenko system is beginning to erode in many places as it
increasingly comes to be viewed as anachronistic.)4
(3) The Japanese workplace is a relatively cooperative and egalitarian
environment. There are few work rules, job reassignments are common, and a high
degree of company loyalty motivates productivity-enhancing behavior.5 Unions
are organized along enterprise or company lines and include white collar as well
as blue collar workers. In addition, blue and white collar workers in the same
firm are comparatively less differentiated than elsewhere in terms of perquisi-
tes, treatment, method of payment (monthly salaries rather than hourly wages--
with meaningful bonus payments), and how much they are paid.
(4) Japanese society as a whole displays a relatively intense commitment
at a grass-roots level to maintaining full employment. Companies and unions
seem almost ashamed to lay off workers outright. Moreover, layoffs are not
generally by seniority. There appears to be a high degree of social respon-
sibility in wage setting in Japan, as was dramatically shown by labor heeding
the 1975 call for wage restraint in the face of strong inflation caused by the
first oil shock. Work sharing is common, as Japanese firms tend to adjust hours3
more than employment and also to hoard more labor in downturns compared to most
other developed countries.6
(5) Bonuses are important quantitively in the average worker's pay
(upwards of one-quarter of pay is in the form of a semi-annual bonus.) They
are also large relative to reported company profits, ranging from from 42—76
percent of operating profits before taxes from 1965 to 1983, and have come to
constitute roughly 10 percent of net domestic product.7
The typical Japanese worker's pay is divided into two categories. The
first component is officially called kimatte shikyusuru kyuyo, "the wage that is
surely paid," which we will refer to simply as base wages, ---althoughthey
are not hourly wages at all, but rather a monthly salary. (Actually the concept
of "overtime" payments and work is not sharply differentiated in Japan,
suggesting that employment rather than person-hours is the fundamental Unit of
labor usage for regular workers.) The second component is called "special cash
payments" in the official statistics and the defining characteristic is held to
be that it is a payment made "temporarily, unexpectedly, or erratically at the
discretion of the employer." This category consists overwhelmingly of bonus
payments, even though their terms and amount are often established by collective
agreements and they are sometimes far from temporary, unexpected, or erratic.
Bonuses are usually paid twice a year-- in summer (mostly June and July),
and at year end (December). Insignificant amounts are sometimes paid in August,
March, and January. Although blue-collar and low status white collar workers
before the war often received a lump sum of money twice a year in addition to
their regular pay, the small amount of money involved was in no way comparable
to the significant semi-annual profit—sharing bonuses received by high—status
white-collar employees with advanced educational backgrounds. It is only after
the Second World War that the payment system emerges in its present form, as4
part of a broader trend. The main feature of this trend was a de-emphasis, to
the point of near-elimination, of the invidious status categories of prewar
Japan with their implicit legacies of a feudal past. As one byproduct of the
immediate postwar process of democratizing the workplace, which the unions fully
supported, all regular employees-- blue collar and white-- were henceforth to be
paid a monthly salary instead of an hourly wage, supplemented by meaningful
semi-annual bonuses for every regular employee irrespective of category.8 The
bonus payments constituted less than two months' worth of supplement after the
war, rose gradually to over four months by 1973 and fell back to slightly more
than three and a half months currently.9
The bonus system is widely viewed as serving three purposes. One purpose,
of particular relevance to this study, is that the bonus system provides some
pay flexibility to help firms maintain the lifetime employment commitment over
bad times and good. Another purpose is to compensate individual effort. Since
the bonus is more discretionary than the base wage of the neriko system (which
'is primarily related to length of service), management typically makes some part
of a particular employee's bonus depend on the merit appraisal of the individual
worker's job performance.10Finally, the bonus emphasizes, symbolically and
practically, the common bond linking the company's well being with the well-
being of its regular workers.
The timing of wage and bonus decisions generally differs. Across many
unionized companies base wage determination is the primary concern of the
economy—wide pattern-bargaining spring wage offensive (shunto) which usually
starts in February and peaks in April. Negotiations over bonuses are typically
done after wages are settled; and, according to management and labor represen-
tatives, are more sensitive to a company or industry's specific circumstances
than base wages, which are primarily dependent on the economy's national perfor-5
mance.
Firms that consistently do well generally succeed in paying a fairly steady
number of months' wages as a bonus, so that in prospering sectors and times,
their bonuses are unlikely to vary much with cyclical conditions. An oft-cited
example of a firm that maintains such a policy is Toyota, which has paid about
the same months' worth of bonus in each year since 1968. But for every Toyota
Motor Company there are companies in, say, machine tools or shipbuilding where
bonuses may vary from two to ten months' pay in extreme economic conditions. At
one such firm, Okuna Machine Works, the standard deviation of the percentage
change of wages from 1957 to 1985 was 7, compared to a standard deviation of the
percentage change of bonuses of 29. Bonuses varied from 9 months to 2 months of
pay -in post-war years. The majority of firms hold a position in between
Toyota and Okuna. For all manufacturing firms aggregated together, the standard
deviation of the log change in bonuses from 1959 to 1983 was .072 compared to a
standard deviation of the log change of wages of .055.12
Surveys conducted by Nikke-iren, the employers' federation, show that most
firms think of bonuses as being influenced by profitability. Among corporations
that make an explicit agreement with employees about bonus payments, some 15 of
such contracts contain profit-sharing clauses.13
The Key Issues
There are three critical issues in evaluating the macroeconomic implica-
tions of the Japanese bonus system.
First -is the extent to which bonuses are more "flexible" with respect to
profits or revenues than are wages, and thus operate as a form of profit or
revenue sharing.
Second is the effect of bonuses on employment. If bonuses are a cost to
employers similar to wages, with no share component, bonuses plus wages are the6
relevant variable defining labor demand, with increases in bonuses reducing
employment just as increases in wages do; contrarily, if bonuses have a non-
negligible profit-sharing component, they might have a very different relation
to employment.
The third, and perhaps most difficult issue to assess is the contribution
of a bonus system that operates along share economy lines to the overall perfor-
mance of the Japanese labor market.
The remainder of the paper examines these three issues. Sections II and
III analyse the determinants of bonuses and the link between bonuses and
employment using data for the entire Japanese economy, for manufacturing, and
for more disaggregated two digit industries, largely within manufacturing.
Section IV turns to the macro-economic implications of our findings.
II. Economic Fluctuations and Bonuses
Are bonuses more responsive to economic conditions than are wages, or are
bonuses simply a markup of wages?
One direct way to examine the relative flexibility of bonuses and wages to
economic conditions is to regress the ratio of monthly bonuses to monthly wages
(the number of months of salary paid in bonuses, which is how most Japanese
think of them) on measures of aggregate or industry economic conditions, con-
ditional on past values of wages and bonuses.
Table 1 contains the results of such an analysis for all industry and for
manufacturing in Japan. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of bonu-
ses to wages from the series of the Japanese Ministry of Labor. To measure
economic conditions we have used: the log of profits (TT) as reported in the
Statistical Survey of Corporate Enterprise series of corporate operating profits
for firms of all sizes; and two related measures of revenues: net domestic
product (NDP) taken from the Japanese Economic Planning Agency data on net out-7
put by industrial origin at market prices; and corporate value added (VA) as
reported in the Statistical Survey of Corporate Enterprises. All of the nominal
variables are deflated by the wholesale price index series of the Bank of Japan,
with the manufacturing price series used for manufacturing, and all three indi-
cators of economic conditions are measured over the Japanese fiscal year (April
1-March 31), which correlates them more closely with the largely spring time
determination of upcoming wage and bonus levels than calendar year data. In
addition to the measures of economic conditions, the equations include a linear
and quadratic function of time, and lagged values of bonuses(B_i) and wages
(W..1) introduced separately to allow for differential autoregressiveness of the
series.
The calculations provide a clear answer to the question of the relative
responsiveness of wages and bonuses to economic conditions: in every case, the
coefficient on the measure of economic conditions is positive and significant,
indicating that bonuses are more responsive to economic conditions than are
wages. Moreover, the coefficient on lagged bonuses is positive and that on
lagged wages is negative, of roughly comparable magnitude, indicating that a
"partial adjustment" type model of the bonus to wage ratio with persistence of
bonuses and wages over time is consistent with the data.
To see whether the results hold up at a more disaggregated level of analy-
sis, we have estimated equations for the ratios of bonuses to wages for 2 digit
industries over the same time period. The results of this analysis are given in
table 2 in terms of the number of industries in which bonuses are more (less)
responsive to the relevant explanatory variable than are wages, categorized by
the size of the t statistic. As can be seen, the analysis supports the finding
that bonuses are more responsive than wages to revenues and profits at the two-
digit level of aggregation, with the vast majority of industries obtaining posi-8
Table 1: Estimates of the Effect of Economic Conditions on the Log Ratio of
Bonuses to Wages, 1959_1983*
Constant Time (time)2 ln(TT) ln(VA) ln(NDP) ln(B_1) ln(W_1) R2 SEE
All Industry
1. -.08 -.09 .001 .18 .67 —.63.98 .018
(.03) (.0002) (.02) (.08) (.11)
2. —.29 -.14 .001 .38 .49 —.58 .98 .019
(.04) (.0003) (.05) (.09) (.12)
3. 1.53 -.17 .001 .42 .47 —.45.94 .032
(.09) (.001) (.17) (.15) (.20)
Manufacturing
4. .62 -.12 .001 .20 .71 -.64 .98 .021
(.04) (.0002) (.02) (.07) (.28)
5. .94 -.21 .001 .49 .53 —.68 .99 .018
(.03) (.0002) (.04) (.06) (.10)
6. 2.55 —.22 .001 .38 .41 —.25.94 .042
(.10) (.001) (.14) (.16) (.23)
Source: See Data Appendix
*Equations including TT and VA are restricted to 1960-1983.9
Table 2: Summary of the Coefficients of the Effect of Profits and Revenues
on log Bonuses/wages
(a)Responses to Profits (b)Respoases to Value Added (c)Responses to NDP
Number of industries Number of industries Number of industries
Bonuses more responsive bonuses more responsive bonuses more responsive
yes no yes no yes no
2 1 0 1 5 2
1<itl<2
1 0 1 0 4 0
2<Itt<3 0 0 4 0 6 0
ItI>3 10 0 8 0 0 0
Total 13 1 13 1 15 2
Source: Panels A & B industries included: MI, CN, WR, RE, FO, TX, CH, CE, IS,
NF, FB, MA, EQ, TQ. See Data Appendix for industry code definitions.
Panel C industries included: MI, CN, WR, RE, TC, EL, FO, TX, CH, PA,
FB, MA, EQ, TQ, Fl, PE, PC. See Data Appendix for industry code defini-
tions.
Based on regressions of log (Bonus/Wages) on time, log (Bonuses(-1)), log
(Wages (-1)) and the log of the relevant measure of economic activity.10
tive and often significant (t>2) impact coefficients. We conclude that although
bonuses are not a simple proportion of profits or revenues they depend substan-
tially on those variables, to a much greater extent than wages, and thus vary
more with economic conditions than do wages.
How do bonuses and wages, taken as separate variables, respond to economic
conditions? Do both wages and bonuses both respond positively to conditions with
the table 1 results due to the greater responsiveness of bonuses, or are bonuses
responsive and wages inflexible?
To answer these questions we have estimated the following equations:
(la) log B A +AalogTT(or R) +(1-X)logB1 +CT
(ib) log W A' +bA'logTT(or R) +(1-A')logw-i +c'T
While the results of our analysis, given in table 3, show that bonuses are
invariably more responsive to conditions than are wages, the estimated coef-
ficients tell a somewhat different story for the effect of revenues than of pro-
fits on the two measures of pay. While both bonuses and wages are positively
related to revenues, only bonuses are significantly affected by profits. Since
our measure of profits is an "after-bonus" measure the finding of a positive
profit—bonus relation is particularly striking.14Finally, note that
interpreting the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable as a partial
adjustment parameter, the implied adjustment parameter A is invariably larger in
the bonus than wage equation, strengthening the conclusion that bonuses are more
responsive than wages.
Alternative Specifications
Thus far, we have estimated models in which bonuses and wages are endoge-
nous variables. Given the timing of negotiations noted in section 1, it is also
reasonable to examine a model in which wages are exogenous (given, say, by the11
Shunto Offensive) and bonuses dependent on wages and economic conditions.If
bonuses are simply a markup of wages, as has sometimes been alleged, then the
profit or revenue variables would not have a significant effect in this
regression. Contrarily, if bonuses were determined solely by "sharing," the
wage term would not enter significantly.15
To examine this possibility we estimate the following equation for all
industry and manufacturing:
(2) log B= A +XalogTT(or R) +(1-A)logB_1 +AclogW+dT
The results given in lines 1 and 2 and 5 and 6 of table 4 show that while
contemporaneous wages are closely related to bonuses, profits or revenues also
have highly significant effects, indicating that bonuses depend on both factors.
They are neither a pure markup of wages nor a pure markup of profits. Finally,
in the simple share economy model workers are presumed to be paid a fixed pro-
portion of profits per worker. To see whether our data are consistent with this
view we estimate an equation in which we replace profits and revenues by profits
per worker and revenues per worker. We record these results in lines 3 and 4
and 7 and 8 of table 4.In this calculation we have simply divided fiscal year
profits (revenues) by fiscal year employment; we have also experimented with
calculations using last period's employment (see table 6). As employment is
relatively stable and profits highly variable it does not matter substantially
how we model the profit/employment or revenue/employment variable. As can be
seen in table 4, the resultant estimates ar-c consistent with our interpretation
of bonus determination as paying a share of profits per worker.
Comparing our results to those of other scholars, we are in accord with
Koshiro and Weitzman, (who use somewhat different data) in finding bonuses to
depend significantly on profits; in addition, however, we find bonuses are
related to another measure of economic performance, revenues. With respect to
the responsiveness of wages to profitability, we cannot find any formal sta-12
Table 3: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Effects of Net Domestic Product,
Value Added, and Profits, on Bonuses and Wages, 1959_1983*
A. All Industry
Dependent Variable constant TIMEln(NDP) 1nTT1nVA lnB ifl-i
1. ln bonuses -.33 -.013 .44 .64 .041
(.005)(.14) (.14)
2.ln wages 1.41 .002 .34 .53 .051
(.009)(.13) (.22)
3.ln bonuses -.13 -.009 .09 .94 .048
(.006) (.05) (.09)
4.ln wages .21 -.01 —.05 1.12 .058
(.01) (.07) (.18)
5.ln bonuses —1.36 -.012 .28 .74 .043
(.005) (.10) (.12)
6.ln wages .25 -.002 .12 .81 .057
(.01) (.12) (.24)
B. Manufacturing
7.ln bonuses .17 -.004 .38 .63 .045
(.006) (.11) (.13)
8.ln wages 1.24 .002 .21 .70 .045
(.009) (.09) (.18)
9.ln bonuses -0.59 -.004 .14 .87 .045
(.006) (.04) (.07)
10.ln wages .22 -.012 —.05 1.14 .049
(.01) (.05) (.14)
1i.lr bonuses -2.30 -.004 .37 .63 .038
(.005) (.08) (.09)
12.ln wages .15 —.004 .05
(.01) (.11) (.22).050
Source: Calculated by least squares using data described in Appendix.
The adjusted R2 for every equation was .99
*Equationsincluding IT and VA cover 1960-1983.13
tistical evidence that base wages alone respond to profits, though we do find
that wages respond to revenues. Some of the Phillips-curve-like pay-formation
regressions in the literature have picked up, we note, a dependence of pay upon
profits.16 But in these exercises the authors typically attempt to explain the
formation of total pay--defined as wages plus bonuses and profits may be pri-
marily affecting the bonus component. On the basis of our findings the entire
subject of empirical Phillips curve measurements for Japan is worthy of reexami-
nation, with more careful attention focused on separating out base wages from
bonuses in the pay—formation process.
Leaving aside the controversial issue of whether or not base wages them-
selves are more responsive to conditions than in other countries, we conclude
that in Japan bonuses respond more than base wages to economic conditions.
III. How Do Bonuses Affect Employment?
The finding that bonuses contain at least some "share" component raises the
possibility that they have a different impact on employment than wages. In this
section we estimate several demand for labor type models designed to examine
the possibility. We start with a simple null hypothesis: that bonuses are
simply part of normal labor costs comparable to wages, so that the appropriate
measure of cost is (W+B), with the division of compensation between wages and
bonuses having no effect on outcomes. In particular we estimate two comparable
partial adjustment for-ms of a demand relation between employment (E), bonuses
(B), wages (W), and measures of the level of demand (X):
(3a) ln E= A +bln(W+B)+XclnB+AdX+(1-A)lnE_1 +eTime
(3b) in E= A' +A'b'lnW+X'c'ln(W+B)+X'd'X+(1—X')lnE_1 +e'Time
In equation (3a), the hypothesis that bonuses are just part of normal labor
cost -is tested by the coefficient on in(S): if the form of compensation is14
Table 4: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Alternative Specifications of the
Effect of Economic Conditions on Log Bonuses, 1960-1983.
Constant Time ln(TT) ln(VA)ln(W) 1nTT/E lnVA/E ln(B_1)SEE
All Industries
1.-3.34 -.02 .11 .75 .43 .026
(.004) (.03) (.11) (.09)
2.-3.89 -.02 .26 .66 .33 .024
(.003) (.06) (.10) (.09)
3. .89 -.01 .07 .99 .049
(.01) (.06) (.08)
4. 2.03 -.01 .25 .87 .046
(.006) (.13) (.11)
B. Manufacturing
5.-3.07 -.01 .14 .61 .52 .030
(.005) (.03) (.13) (.09)
6. —3.87 -.01 .32 .48 .40 .029
(.005) (.06) (.12) (.09)
7. 1.41 —.01 .14 .93 .046
(.01) (.04) (.06)
8. 2.96 -.01 .37 .77 .041
(.006) (.09) (.08)
Source: See Data Appendix.
The R2 for every equation was .99.
*Equations including E are restricted to 1960-1982.15
irrelevantto employment and the data are determined by demand forces, the coef-
ficient on in (B) will be (approximately) 0 while that on in (W +B)will be
negative. In equation (3b), the test of the hypothesis that the composition of
compensation is irrelevant to employment is that the coefficient on ln(W +B)be
negative and that on in W be zero. By including both bonus and wage variables
as separate factors in the equation our model differs from those of other ana-
lysts of demand for labor in Japan.17
As the reader will note, it is the log form of the demand equations which
dictates estimation of the two comparable forms. If we modelled demand as a
linear equation, one of the two equations would be redundant.
A significant problem with demand relations of this form relates to the
measurement of "level of demand" factors. Som analysts enter output measures
or output measures instrumented on other variables to measure the level of
demand. Other analysts prefer to exclude such variables due to the production
function relation between output and employment. Such exclusions yield reaso-
nable demand relations for some European countries but not for the U.S. (see
Symons and Layard). To make sure our results do not depend on how we treat
demand shift-variables, we include output measures in some regressions and
exclude them from others, with, as will be seen, little effect on our findings.
Another problem with models of this form relates to specifying the causa-
lity as going from wages (bonuses) to employment in an aggregate economy with
extremely low unemployment. Most analyses of labor demand, in fact, focus on
manufacturing where one can plausibly argue that wages are set economy-wide,
making employment a function of wages at the sector level. A priori, one anti-
cipates that a demand model will fit a single sector better than it will fit an
entire essentially full-time employment labor market.
Table 5 presents our estimates of the impact of wages, wages plus bonuses,
and of bonuses, on employment. Panel A treats the manufacturing industries where16
our results are particularly striking; Panel B treats the entire economy. The
even-numbered equations exclude output; the odd-numbered equations include out-
put as a measure of the level of demand. In addition to the calculations in the
table, we experimented with various other demand-shift variables (including
profits) and with instrumental variable estimates of demand shifts, instru—
nienting output on such factors as exports, money supply, etc. Because inclusion
of the output variables has only a modest impact on our estimated bonus and
wage coefficients, the way in which we treat demand shift variables is not a
critical issue in the analysis, (in contrast to the importance of output terms
in U.S. labor demand equations).
The key finding, which runs through all the calculations, is that bonuses
have a markedly different effect on employment than do wages, obtaining positive
rather than negative coefficients in the estimates. When our two variables are
bonuses and bonuses plus wages the, coefficient on bonuses is significantly posi-
tive while the coefficient on wages plus bonuses is significantly negative.
When bonuses plus wages are included with wages, the wage term obtains a nega-
tive coefficient while the bonuses plus wage yields a positive coefficient.
The strength of our finding differs, we note, between highly cyclical manu-
facturing and the rest of industry. In manufacturing, the two elements of com-
pensation have such different effects that we can fairly readily reject our null
hypothesis. In all industry, the weaker estimated negative effect of wages
(wages plus bonuses) on employment gives a more equivocal result, although even
here it is apparent that bonuses have a positive impact on employment different
from the effect of wages.18
Probing the Results
The finding that bonuses are positively rather than negatively associated
with employment, (in contrast to wages) is sufficiently striking as to merit17
Table 5: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Estimates of Bonuses and Wages
on Log Employment, 1959—82
Panel A: Manufacturing
Con- in in in
stant Time (W+B) ln(W) ln(B) NDP (E_1) R2 SEE
1. 7.21 .0002 —.37 .21 .15 .59 .99 .009
(.002) (.05) (.05) (.03) (.05)
2. 10.37 .0001 -.33 .28 .72 .98 .014
(.003) (.10) (.07) (.08)
3. 6.60 .0001 .49 -.65 .16 .59 .99 .009
(.002) (.15) (.14) (.03) (.05)
4. 4.39 .0008 .83 -.87 .74 .98 .015
(.003) (.23) (.25) (.08)
Panel B: All Industry
5. 6.59 .005 -.39 .14 .32 .56 .99 .019
(.003) (.16) (.13)(.09) (.14)
6. 2.80 .003 —.20 .18 .86 .99 .025
(.004) (.20) (.16) (.14)
7. 5.20 .005 .14 -.40 .33 .56 .99 .019
(.003) (.38) (.39) (.09) (.14)
8. 1.99 .002 .39 -.41 .88 .99 .025
(.004) (.50) (.51) (.14)
Source: see Data Appendix.18
additional probing.
Could the result be due to some type of aggregation bias?
To see if the result holds up at a more disaggregated level we estimated
equations like those in table 5 for separate two digit industries and found
results consistent with those in the table. In these calculations bonuses
obtain positive coefficients in 6 of 10 manufacturing industries in (3a) and
bonuses plus wages obtain positive coefficients in the same 6 in equation (3b),
with 5 of the positive coefficients having t>1.19 In 6nonmanufacturing
industries, by contrast, the results were weaker, which is consistent with the
weak economy—wide results obtained in panel B of the table.2° Ourstrongest
finding is clearly for manufacturing.
Could the result be due to some form of reverse causality or related problem
in which bonuses and employment are positively correlated because increases in
employment (reflecting good times) cause higher bonuses?
To examine this possibility we have estimated two lagged models which enable
us to "testt' whether employment determines bonuses or bonuses determine
employment by examining the lagged impact of bonuses on employment and of
employment on bonuses in the spirit of Sims-Granger causality tests. For
simplicity, we report results where all variables are defined on a calendar
year basis; the results with bonuses related to fiscal year variables as in our
earlier tables gives comparable results to those in the table. The results,
given in table 6, suggest that the causal link is from bonuses to employment
rather than from employment to bonuses.In manufacturing, lagged bonuses have a
positive effect on employment (in contrast to the negative effect of lagged
wages on employment), while lagged employment has a negative effect on bonuses.
In all industry, bonuses have an insignificant positive impact on employment
(contrasted to a negative effect for wages) whereas employment negatively19
effects bonuses. These results are inconsistent with an employment causes bonu-
ses model but are, we note, consistent with a share model interpretation of the
data, as increases in employment reduce workers' earnings from profit sharing in
the share model.
Taking our finding of a positive bonus-employment relation at face value,
how might we go about interpreting it?
There seem to be two basic modes of interpretation: one in which bonuses
are viewed as operating along theoretic share economy lines; and one in which
bonuses are taken as an indicator of the level of demand in a given period.
First, from a share economy perspective, one may want to read the result as
indicating that bonuses, while part of the attractiveness of jobs to workers,
are not fully part of the marginal cost of employment to firms. From this
perspective the data suggest that we are estimating a mixed supply and demand
reduced form equation, with W +Bprimarily reflecting supply influences on
employment and W primarily reflecting demand influences, with the gap between
them indicating the "excess demand" for labor in a share system.21
What might one do to test such an interpretation? A purist would develop a
detailed econometric model of supply and demand disequilibrium to estimate the
"structural equations" and to evaluate the predicted excess demand for labor.
To implement such a program in practice would require more data on the Japanese
labor market than the wage, employment, and bonus series that we have analysed
here. For example, one would want some direct measure of the share parameter
that in principle determines the contract, rather than measures of bonuses.
(Bonuses differ significantly from share parameters -in that they change for two
reasons: changes in labor's share of profits (revenues) or changes in the level
of profits (revenues).) One would also want direct measures of vacancies by
sector and over time to indicate potential changes and differences in "excess20
demand for labor" as bonuses vary. It would also be useful to have evidence on
patterns of recruitment of new workers. In the absence of such data, and the
need to make specific and somewhat arbitrary assumptions about disequilibrium
forms, we are loathe to pursue this line with our data. Virtually any reaso-
nable disequilibrium formulation will end up with reduced form mixed supply and
demand equations like those we have estimated, with predicted coefficients
having signs like those we have found.
A second possible interpretation of our finding is that bonuses are a
"proxy" for shifts in labor demand. We do not think that this offers as good an
interpretation of the data. First, we have attempted to control for such demand
shifts by the explicit inclusion of output terms, yet the signs on bonuses and
wages were unchanged. Additionally, the causal lag relation between employment
and bonuses we've found is inconsistent with this view. Furthermore, it is not
enough for a particular firm or sector to "demand" more labor in a full
employment economy; a plausible story must be told about how the labor is
obtained-—- e.g., through increased pay (W +B)on the supply side. Of course
it is still logically possible to argue that bonuses are a superior measure of
the level of the labor demand schedule. (After all, we did find them to vary
substantially with the cycle.) Even this interpretation, however, clearly sup-
ports the notion that bonuses are not part of normal labor cost.
In any case, whatever the ultimate explanation, bonuses are different from
wages in Japan, in their effects on employment as well as in their sensitivity
to economic conditions. Without pushing the "share economy" interpretation of
the data too far, our results do seem to have the "flavor" of such a system.
IV. Macroeconomic Implications of the Bonus System
We come now to the difficult question of whether the Japanese bonus system
















Source: See Data Appendix.
The R2 for every equation was .99
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ModelII:Bonuses and Employment endogenous;
iri(B) 7.10 —.02 .47—.57 .72
(.006)(.08) (.19)(.09)
ln(E) 7.67 —.002.21 .53 .08
(.002)(.03) (.07)(.03)
All Industry
ModelI:Wages, Bonuses and Employment taken
ln(W) 8.09 .009 .51 -.46 .29
(.008)(.14) (.32)(.19)
ln(B) 5.72 -.01 .60 -.48 .81
(.005)(.10) (.23)(.14)
ln(E) 6.43 .006 .23 .55 .08
(.004)(.08) (.17)(.10)
ModelII:Bonuses and Employment endogenous;
ln(B) 1.07 -.016 .41 —.22 .59
(.004)(.13) (.21)(.10)










account for the low unemployment rates found in Japan over the last quarter
century.22 Other things being equal, it stands to reason that the existence of a
bonus component of pay with a more automatic pro-cyclical link than base wages
should help an economy to maintain a higher level of employment than if wages
alone were paid. But how important a factor, quantitatively, is this likely to
be in the Japanese case?Given the current state of macroeconomics, with
widely divergent schools of thought, it is not clear how to pose the appropriate
hypothesis formally so that the existing data might, at least in principle,
allow us to extricate a reasonably controversy-free answer. Rather than trying
to confront the issue head on with a formal model, we limit ourselves here to
some rough calculations designed to give likely orders of magnitudes of effects.
The bonus itself is about one fourth of an average worker's total pay.By
running regressions in logarithms we have estimated the elasticity of aggregate
bonus response to changed aggregate profits at about .09 (see line 3, table 3).
Converting this parameter to a linear equivalent, the same elasticity of .09 is
obtained if 9 of the bonus payment is strictly proportional to profits, while
the other 91 is like a fixed constant. The folowing crude imputation can then
be made. About 2.259 (9 x 25) of a Japanese worker's total pay can be treated
as genuine profit sharing income, compared with the other 97.75, which for
economic purposes is better described as being like an imputed base wage.
A rough check on this calculation is possible using our equations linking
bonuses to revenues. The elasticity of aggregate bonus payments with respect to
aggregate value added, or revenue, was estimated to be about .44 (see line 1)
table 3). Converting to an equivalent-elasticity linear revenue-sharing formula
makes 44 of the bonus payment strictly proportional to revenues, while the other
56 is like a fixed constant. If aggregate imputed base wages are roughly three
fourths of aggregate revenues, that leaves one fourth for gross profits. By
this calculation, 11(l/4 x 44%) of the bonus payment is strictly proportional to23
profits, while the rest is like a fixed constant. Following this line of
reasoning, about 2.75 (11% x 25) of a typical Japanese worker's total pay can
be treated as genuinely proportional to profits, while the remainder is like an
imputed base wage.
Splitting the difference between the high (2.75) and low (2.25) calcula-
tions, we can make the following very rough statement: in any year about 97.5
of an average Japanese worker's total pay is like a fixed imputed base wage,
while 2.5 automatically responds directly to profits. If pay contracts are
annually renegotiated, the marginal cost to the employer of hiring an extra unit
of labor in any given year is just the (imputed) base wage, as opposed to total
pay.23 The relevant theory then predicts that the Japanese economy should
behave like an otherwise absolutely identical (but hypothetical) wage economy
whose wages are 2.5 lower than actual Japanese pay (base wages plus bonus) but
whose maintained levels of aggregate demand (autonomous spending, the money
supply, and world demand for Japanese exports) are the same.24 In other words,
-if someone who thought that Japan was a wage economy and has just now been
informed that it is in fact (partially) a revenue or profit-sharing economy
wants to know what difference that makes, the answer is: the same difference
as if money wages were perpetually 2.5 lower than what they appeared to be.
While the exact ramifications of a 2.5 wage cut depend on the macro model in
which it is embedded, our reaction is neither to dismiss this effect as negli-
gible nor to argue that it is likely to represent an overwhelming factor in the
economy. At one extreme, assume a Keynesian monetarist-type model, in which a
2.59 reduction -inwagesreduces prices by 2.5. Supposing, further, that this is
equivalent to a 2.5 expansion in output, then employment will increase 2.5?
(given constant returns to scale). At another extreme, assume that a 2.596
reduction in wages does not affect prices at all (they are set on world markets)24
so that the reduction in wages raises employment along a demand curve. If the
elasticity of demand is taken conservatively to be about one half, we would have
1 higher employment, giving us a range of employment effects from 13 to 2i.
This kind of counterfactual historical exercise should be understood in
proper perspective. First of all, the calculations are extremely crude.
Secondly, they are based on a particular interpretation of a particular theory.
Thirdly the "thought experiment" is necessarily artificial.(If there were
lower bonuses but higher base wages, it could be argued, wages might become more
flexible, timing in the economy might be altered, or fiscal or monetary policy
might be changed, perhaps thereby neutralizing some of the effects calculated
here.)
These limitations notwithstanding, we think the exercise is useful for
gaining some rough insight into the likely size of what might be called the
"pure bonus effect." We interpret the orders of magnitude involved as
suggesting that the Japanese bonus system may have exerted a non-negligible
macroeconomic influence by helping automatically to boost employment without
inflationary pressure. But the significance of an "as if" 3 money wage cut
is not nearly so great as to account for the entire unemployment story, nor to
eliminate output fluctuations,25 nor to do away with the need for discretionary
policy to maintain full employment, especially in the face of severe economic
shocks.
That the bonus system alone cannot possibly be explaining the entire
macroeconomic adjustment story is made abundantly clear by the extreme example
of Japan's response to the energy crisis. After the first oil shock, in 1974,
consumer prices increased by about 25 and wholesale prices by over 3O; output
in manufacturing and mining fell by 1O. At first the unions had no better pre-
monition than anyone else that a permanent terms—of—trade deterioration was25
underway, and were concerned to recoup lost purchasing power as well as to
obtain their customary pay increase. In the spring offensive of that year, base
wages jumped by 33, strike days lost were 2.? per 10,000, a rate double that in
previous years and above the rate -in the U.S. in many years. An observer
looking simply at these figures would have predicted that the Japanese economy
would have been more likely to have gone into a major stagflation decline than
the U.S. or European economies. But such was not the case. At this point, when
the mechanics of a potentially vicious wage—price spiral started to become evi-
dent, the famous Japanese consensus took over. Government officials, labor
experts, businessmen, and labor union leaders began preaching wage and price
restraint. The 1975 shunto saw base wages increase by only 13, and they have
been held to the single digit range since then; the consumer price index rate
of increase fell to 10.4, and while output -in manufacturing and mining declined
by 4.4 -in 1975 it rose by 10.8 in 1976. Strike days lost fell sharply to 0.9
per 10,000 in 1976 and to virtually zero in succeeding years.26
Because base wages constitute three fourths of Japanese pay, and only part
of bonuses are responsive to profits (revenue), the deceleration of wage
increases was quantitatively more important -in stabilizing employment than was
the adjustment of bonuses. However much the Japanese bonus system may be
helping as an automatic employment stabilizer (months of bonus pay declined
sharply after 1974-- see the Appendix figures), in stepping back from high
inflation in the mid-1970s Japan relied upon flexible wage-setting to a greater
extent than flexible bonuses, as it had to, given the share of wages in total
compensation and the magnitude of the macroeconomic shock.
Conclus ion
In this paper we have examined a relatively unique aspect of the Japanese
labor market --paymentof bonuses which constitute a quarter of workers! pay.26
Our analysis has rejected the notion that bonuses are just another form of wage
payment on two grounds:(1) bonuses behave differently than wages over the
cycle, responding to profits and responding more to revenues than do wages; and
(2) bonuses affect employment differently from wages, having a positive rather
than negative link to employment. While bonuses are not set by pure share eco-
nomy principles,they are sufficiently responsive to profits or revenues and
affect employment in ways that have the flavor of a share economy. Our estimate
is that they contribute somewhat to the success of the Japanese economy by auto-
matically helping to stabilize unemployment at relatively low levels. The impor-
tance of reductions in the rate of change of base wages during the first oil
crisis, however, makes it clear that, as presently constituted, the bonus system
in Japan is by no means the main factor behind Japanese ability to weather
severe shocks of that kind better than most other developed countries. This
example highlights our basic conclusion. The bonus system helps Japan to main-
tain relatively tight labor markets, but so too do other, probably complementary
aspects of the Japanese system beyond the focus of this study.27
Footnotes
1. Weitzman, (1984), (1985).
2. Shimada (1983) contains an excellentsurvey of the English language litera—
ture.
3. Koike (1983a), (1983b), and references therein, sometimesargues the
contrary view that Japanese industrial relations, and particuarly the
lifetime employment system, are not nearly so unique as is sometimesmade
out. He has a point when he does not push this view too hard. Anotherview
is contained in Hashimoto and Raisian (1985). Tachibanakinotes that much
of the difference in job tenure in Japan and the U.s. results fromworkers
obtaining permanent jobs directly out of school in Japan whereas in the U.S.
workers job shop before taking a permanent job.
4. For discussion of the nenko system, see,e.g., Sh-imada (1983) or Shirai
(1983b). Also see Tachibanak-j (1982).
5.For descriptions of the Japanese workplace, see Koshiro (1983a). See also
Koike "Skill Formation System in the U.S. and Japan: AComparative Study"
in Aoki(1984).
6. On many of these points see Shirai (1983b). Hours adjustmentsare discussed
in Hamada and Kurosaka (1984).
7.In this calculation we divide bonuses by operating profits.Using a narrower
measure of profits, "current profits," we get anywhere from 56-160percent
between 1965 and 1983.
8. This interpretation is emphasized by, among others, Shirai (1983b),p. 131.28
9. See the Appendix table.
10. See, e.g., Okuno (1984).
11. See Grossman.
12. The Okuna data here calculated are from the union's report to its workers.
The standard deviations for manufacturing are calculated from the Ministry
of Labor data in our Appendix table.
13. Koshiro (1983b), pp. 241-242, contains a good discussion of bonus respon-
siveness to profits. For figures on firms with explicit profit—sharing see
Japanese Ministry of Labor, General Survey on Wage and Working Hours System.
14. If there is any resultant error in bonuses, it would induce negative corre-
lation with profits less bonuses.
15. We recognize that bonuses and wages are set separately but since we omitted
a relevant variable in both equations, we get wages entering the bonus
equation as a proxy for the omitted variable.
16. See, e.g., Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983), Koshiro (1983b), or the
results reported in Hamada and Kurosaka (1985).
17. See the references in 17.
18. One interpretation of the "better" results for manufacturing than for all
industry is that we are not identifying a demand equation in a full
employment economy.
19. The equation ln(E)= a +bln(B+W)+cln(B)+dln(NDP)+eTime+fln(E.1)
was estimated for 10 manufacturing industries with the following results:29
Number of industries withNumber of industries with






The manufacturing industries included are: FO, TX, PA, CH, PE, FB, MA, EQ,
TQ, PC. See Data Appendix for industry codes.
Similar results were obtained estimating
in (E) =a+bln(B +W)+cln(W)+dlin(NDP)+eTime+fln(E_1)
20. The equation ln(E) =a+bln(B+W)+cin(B)+dln(NDP)+eTime+fln(E...1)
was estimated for 6 non-manufacturing industries with the following results:
Number of industries withNumber of industries with
coefficients b<0 and c>0 other values for b and/or c
Total 3 3
jt!<1 2 2
i< t <2 1 1
The non-manufacturing industries included are: MI, WR, Fl, RE, TC, EL. See
data appendix for industry codes.
Similar results were obtained estimating
ln(E)= a +bln(B+W)+cln(W)+dln(NDP)+eTime +ln(E..1)30
21. In terms of the usual supply-demand graph bonuses are a measure of the gap
between supply and demand along the cost axis at the point where employment
is set in a share economy.
22. It should be noted that Japan's number one status in having the lowest
unemployment rate among major industrialized economies did not emerge until
the 1970's. In the 1960's, some other countries like Germany had equally
good employment records. There has been some discussion in the literature
about the extent to which Japanese statistics may underestimate the
unemployment rate by international standards. Taira (1983) and a few others
have tried to argue this case. But it is not very convincing (see, e.g.,
Sorrentino(1984), Hamada and Kurosaka(1985)). The basic point is that when
reasonable adjustment measures are applied uniformly to all countries in an
attempt to make international standards more uniform, then all
countries' unemployment rates increase slightly, but without much altering
their relative standing. Japan's unemployment record remains outstanding
even after playing the readjustment game.
23. If the relevant contract adjustment period is more than a year, due to pay
parameter stickiness, the profit-sharing component grows in importance rela-
tive to the base wage component because of the distributed-lag difference
equation buildup. In that case the effect of profit-sharing is somewhat
more pronounced. It is hard to imagine how imputed base wages as seen by
the employer could decline much more than about 56 below total pay.
24. See Weitzman(1985). The basic idea is that the effect on the firm of con-
verting 2l of pay from base wages to profit shares is to lower wages by
three percent while simultaneously being subjected to a compensating tax on
profits.31
25. Depending on how output is detrended from its high growth rates, Japanese
output stability might be judged outstanding or mediocre. Actually, Japan
has the steadiest growth rate among all OECD countries over the pastquarter
century if it is measured by relative deviations from a standardized
mean. In terms of absolute deviations from a non-standardized mean,
Japanese growth shows much more cyclical variability. Note that, with a
sprinkling of temporary price stickiness, the relevant model of a
profit-sharing economy would predict relatively full employment but some
building up of inventories, make-work, or labor hoarding during slack
periods. Thus, the large Okun coefficient for Japan (see Hamada and
Kurosaka (1984)) is not in itself a theoretical contradiction with share-
economy-like interpretations.
26. Data in this paragraph are taken from Japan Productivity Center Practical
Handbook of Productivity and Labor Statistics, 1985.32
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DATAAPPENDIX
I. Industry Code Definitions
AL All Industries Covered
MI Mining
CM Construction
WR Wholesale and Retail Trade
Fl Finance and Insurance
RE Real Estate
TC Transportation and Communication
El Electricity, Gas and Water
MF Manufacturing
FO. .. .Food,Tobacco and Kindred Products
TX... .Textile Mill Products
AP.. ..Appareland Related Products
LU.... Lumber and Wood Products
RU... .Furniture and Fixtures
PA. ... Pulp,Paper and Paper Products
PR... .Publishing, Printing, and Allied Products
CII....Chemicaland Allied Products
PE. ...Petroleumand Coal Products
RU... .Rubber and Rubber Products
LE. .. .Leatherand Leather Products
IS.... Iron and Steel
NF. .. .Non-ferrousMetals and Products
FB. .. . FabricatedMetal Products
MA... .Machinery
EQ... .Electrical Machinery, Equipment and Supplies
TQ. .. . TransportationEquipment
PC. .. .PrecisionMachineryIi
II.Data Definitions and Sources
VARIABLE NAME DEFINITION AND SOURCE
B*Bonuses Special cash payments not included in any previous
contract, agreement or rule. Average yen per month per
regular worker in firms with 5 or more regular workers.
Monthly average over the calendar year. Japanese
Ministry of Labor, Monthly Labor Statistics.
E Employees
1964-1983: Total number of regular workers employed indefinitely or
under contract for a period longer than one month, in
establishments with a least 5 regular workers. Data for
January 1st of each year were shifted to a calendar year
average.Japanese Ministry of Labor, Yearbook of Labor
Statistics, Survey on Employment Trend.
1958-1963: Non-manufacturing Industries.
The number of regular workers employed in establishments
with at least 5 regular workers, by industry, was esti-
mated with the following methodology:
A number of regular workers in firms with 30 or more
regular workers, available for December 31st of each
year. Japanese Ministry of Labor, Yearbook of Labor
Statistics, Labor Turnover Survey.
B= total number of employees in firms with 5 or more
regular workers. This data was available for December
31st of 1957, 1960 and 1963; data for other years were
interpolated between these figures. Japanese Census of
Establishments, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of
the Prime Minister.
C= total number of employees in firms with 30 or more
regular workers. Availability and source same as for B.
This series was then calculated as A*(B/C).
The ratio B/C is used as an estimate of the ratio of
regular workers in firms with 5 or more regular workers
to regular workers in firms with 30 or more (the actual
ratio was unavailable except for 1960.) A comparison
of the two ratios for 1960 by industry was favorable,
indicating that the estimate is a fairly good one. The
end of year data for 195863 was scaled to a first of
year basis based on the 1963/1964 comparison. The
first-of-year series was then shifted to a calendar year
average.
Manufactur- Industries
The number of regular workers employed in establishments
with at least 5 regular workers, by industry, was esti-
mated with the following methodology:
A= number of regular workers in firms with 30 or more
regular workers, on December 31st of each year.iii
JapaneseMinistry of Labor, Yearbook of Labor
Statistics, Labor Turnover Survey.
B= total number of employees in firms with between 4
and 29 regular workers, on December 31st of each year.
Japanese office of the Prime Minister, Japan Statistical
Yearbook, Census of Manufacturing.
C= ratio of total employees to regular workers in firms
with 5 to 29 regular workers, for 1960. Japanese Census
of Establishments, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office
of the Prime Minister.
This series was then calculated as A + (BxC). This end
of year data for 1958-63 was scaled to a first of year
basis based on the 1963/64 comparison. The entire
series was then shifted to a calendar year average.
NDP*Net Domestic Net output by industrial origin at market prices over
Product the calendar year. In 1978 the Japanese Economic
Planning Agency overhauled its system of national
accounts, resulting in some discrepancies in the time
series. Because of this the 1970-79 (ARNA) series is
spliced on to the 1979-83 (ARNA) series, and 1958-74
(ARNIS) is spliced on to 1970-83 (ARNA). Japanese
Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National
Accounts (ARNA), previously Annual Report on National
Income Statistics (ARNIS). This data was used on a
fiscal year basis in tables 1 through 4 and on a calen-
dar year basis in tables 5 and 6.
P** Profit Total corporate operating profit for firms of all sizes
by industry for fiscal years. (e.g. data for 1960 covers
April 1, 1959—March 31, 1960). Statistical Survey of
Corporate Enterprise.
TimeTime Trend Linear time trend over all years in sample.
VA** Value Added Total corporate value added for firms of all sizes by
industry for fiscal years. (e.g. data for 1960 covers
April 1, 1959- March 31, 1960.) Statistical Survey of
Corporate Enterprise.
W Wages Cash earnings paid on the basis of previously determined
contracts, collective agreements or wage regulations.
Average yen paid per month per regular worker in firms
with 5 or more regular workers. Monthly average over
the calendar year. Japanese Ministry of Labor,
Yearbook of Labor Statistics.
WPI Price Index Calendar year average of the wholesale price index by
groups of commodities, 1980=100. Industries were
assigned the price index of the most closely aligned
commodity. Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual.
*Variable deflated by the WPI.
**Va-ele da'lated y a Fiscal ysrWP1calculated as:
FYWPIt =3/4WPIt_i 1,'4wPItE
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